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The perverse incentives created by Deposit Insurance

June 11, 2025 1 comment

The origin of these is well summed up here:

“I can assure you that when you don’t have the full faith and credit of your government you care a lot about the management of systematic risk. I don’t think anyone at Silicon Valley Bank cared about it a damn bit.” (because depositors had deposit insurance – and management could go wild).

Managing Bear Market Performance

There is of course no fancy way or means whereby you can either:

  1. Avoid bear markets. They are a fact of investment life; or,
  2. Devise ways of beating these markets. They are capital markets.

You can however understand and thus try to manage the type and extent of your exposure to risks arising in bear markets. Understanding their broad characteristics is a rational place to start. The past helps – somewhat – with this.

Definitions

  1. Bear market – a 20% drop from a recent (material) high
  2. Correction – a 10% drop from a recent high.

Recovery or move to a new phase involves observing reversals in these. Two things to notice. First the numbers are arbitrary – but so are any numbers. Consistency is more important than being overly precious. Second, a bear market may be well underway prior to its being noticed.

Characteristics (based on US equities – a good enough global proxy)

  1. The average bear market sees a 36% drop in prices
  2. The average bull market sees a 114% gain in prices
  3. Since 1928 26 bear markets in the US
  4. Since 1928 27 bull markets

Thus long run equities have gained and that by a significant margin over that period, bears have ben unavoidable but so have bulls so simple “buy and hold” would have won handsomely had it been stuck to.

  1. A bear market lasts an average of 280 days or 9 months
  2. A bull market lasts an average of 991 days or 2.7 years.

Do these change? Of course they do. These are averages. Reality unfolds in cases.

Undershooting and Overshooting

  1. half of the strongest days in the last 20 years occured during a bear market; and,
  2. A third o best days in a bull market occurred in the first 2 months of that market.

It is close to impossible to “time” this sort of price behaviour.

Conclusions

  1. Up beats down over the long run
  2. Most action has occured before we are aware of it
  3. Stay invested – you wont “pick” changes easily
  4. Equities have risen 78% of the time over the last 92 years.

Over a 50 year time horizon expect 14 bear markets but expect not to know when they will occur.

For portfolio strategies to help cope see THE FINANCIAL STRATEGIES GROUP LTD FAP -FSP771591.

Categories: Investment & Finance

Will Higher Interest Rates Demolish Equities?

September 18, 2022 Leave a comment

It is commonly supposed that the higher interest rates currently being deployed by central banks to address inflation are very likely to depress share prices. US data suggests that inflation is the bigger danger.

For the period 1928 to 2021 annual returns show:

With rising inflation average returns sat at 5.6%

With falling inflation average returns sat at 14.7%

In contrast

With rising interest rates average returns sat at 9.7%

With falling interest rates average returns sat at 9.6%

Data: Ben Carlson drawing on US Securities data (Blog A Wealth of Common Sense)

There seems to be no discernible trend associated with interest rates whereas rising inflation seems to be worse news than falling inflation – at least for the US. A proximate explanation may be that inflation, being an across-the-board erosion in purchasing power, is difficult to escape whereas share prices being driven by numerous factors only one of which is the immediate cost of money (at least in the shorter term) exhibit a more muted response to interest rate rises.

First approximation of equity declines

While the reason for each decline may differ, market pullbacks are part of the game. Based on history, in the US at least, for equities markets we can expect drawdowns of:

  • Down 10% every 10-12 months;
  • Down 20% roughly every four years; and
  • Down 30% approximately every 10 years.

Obviously, even bigger declines can occur. Seeking more precision than this is spurious. Accepting this is prudent. Managing for it successfully is one holy grail.

Categories: Investment & Finance

Volcanic Analysis

November 23, 2021 Leave a comment

Matt Levine at Bloomberg is likely one of the best analysts Wall Street has. He is shrewd, unpretentious, on the money and his written output – daily – would easily match Tyler Cowan’s reading speed. He has a great description of El Salvador’s move to adopt bitcoin as its monopoly currency. It is “millennial capture” thumbnailed into a couple of thoughts and expressed succinctly….

“[T]his is an example of market segmentation by standing in front of a PowerPoint presentation at a Bitcoin party wearing a backwards baseball cap. This is market segmentation by slapping a cool name — “Volcano Bond” — on a bond that is strictly worse than a readily available alternative. This is market segmentation by combining a normal thing with (1) crypto and (2) a huge markup, and then marketing it to crypto people who want to pay the huge markup not to buy crypto (they can just buy crypto!) but to buy into a crypto adventure.”

While there is little doubt that digital currency will expand and perhaps clear the stage of other dangerous political instruments while shutting down the “Fed Watcher” industry to all our benefit…. There are likely to be stumbles along the way. Matt’s eyes are a great means for watching this. See Matt Levine – Bloomberg

Categories: Investment & Finance

Buy Now Regulate Later

November 6, 2021 Leave a comment

The government has shown its typically regulatory interest in the burgeoning “buy now pay later” segment of the capital market. This “I can’t see the costs so it must be free” approach to relatively high risk easy come but not so easy go credit has been growing strongly in NZ just as it has elsewhere. Various “caring Ministers” have now shown considerable warmth to the idea of “saving” any poor darlings who get lost under this new money tree – and of course the weapon of choice is the fired up and ready to go legislative battery already operated by the various save our souls agencies.

There are, baldly, two choices here:

  1. Crunch all providers of any form of credit even handedly and thoroughly consistently, with the full blast of the “Ministers know what’s the best risk for you, what you can afford and what you need and I’m going to stop you and anyone trying to say otherwise from moving outside my plan for you.” The “here for you cradle to financial grave” approach to financial security – which is, incidentally, popular with providers since it tends to handily exclude the competition and lock in profit for the incumbent.

Or

  1. The far less popular, “time for some adulting. You know perfectly well there are no free lunches, and you know better than anyone else what you can and cannot afford. If you choose to disregard what you know in your head and your heart you stand to play your own Squid Game and lose. It has always been this way and with no “fools paradise regulation” to pretend to help you, you have learned how to deal with this. It’s a pain yes. But it’s realistic and long run you know you are better off”.

Unsurprisingly neither providers nor politician are in favour of this second approach. It generates competition, there are no babies to be kissed, it calls for “do nothing” and providers must seriously look after their would-be borrowers.

Either choice demands absolute consistency (or its simply not equitable or “fair”), serious enforcement (not cherry picking what regulators figure they can win in court) and it needs to provide disclosed risk low cost finance to those needing credit rather than a whimsical, dream on Yeah/Nah approach to capital.

Categories: Investment & Finance

Property Is Not Immediate Realisable Cash Wealth

November 3, 2021 Leave a comment

This is the classic case of illusory wealth. ‘Level and trajectory’ of house prices creating risks for recent buyers – Reserve Bank Financial Stability Report (msn.com)

In the article there are two statements:

  1. Household wealth has grown by 27% so people have plenty of wealth and ability to withstand shocks. They then say more than half of this is through growth in home values – housing. That’s the RB
  2. Then Core logic say much the same. People have plenty of scope because their property has risen in value and they are wealthy.

NONE of that is liquid. It is not cash. It depends on

  • The housing market staying up there
  • Strong liquidity in housing markets
  • Willingness of credit providers to take illiquid houses to secure the credit card

BUT

  • You cant sell “bits” of houses
  • A house takes six (6) weeks to settle…. No money for 6 weeks
  • When liquidity drops vendors fix that by selling for less and prices go down
  • So attempts to “drive liquidity into the market” reduce prices

The problem then is that lending is secured against illiquid assets which cannot be readily crystallised into cash in a timely fashion.

Property increases may produce a number of things. Immediately Realisable (liquid) Cash is not one of them.

Cost of Capital in the December Quarter

September 30, 2021 Leave a comment

Estimation is currently challenging…. as it ever is!

A few points and my current (as always subject to the Rev. Bayes) estimate for N.Z.:

  1. the estimate is always expectational
  2. most important not to get overly side tracked by the short run
  3. most important not to confuse Govt “policy attempts” to set prices with what may happen

Thus I note:

Riskfree rate? 5 year govt stock may still be the best rough long run approximation. Say 4%

Equity Risk Premium (Rm – Rf)? Damodaran option estimate after tax and sovereign risk adjusted 4.7%

This gives us 8.7% as a market post investor tax based cost of equity capital for NZ. Say 9%.

For those interested in WACC, recent Commerce Commission work suggests that the average premium for corporate debt might be in the order of 2% at present, and observation of the NZX50 suggests a debt to total capital ratio of around 38%

When Financial Economics and Music Collide

September 28, 2021 Leave a comment

In the late 80s it was popular amongst the more buttoned down and starchy of my investment banker and legal colleagues to be fairly sniffy about what were termed “buyout firms” which designed and implemented leveraged takeover bids for underperforming companies then seeking to re-structure, lift performance and add value to often moribund under performers with lazy balance sheets and extensive empires.

A favourite (and not always popular) LBO firm of mine, expert in this area, was Kohlberg, Kravis Roberts or KKR. Their first high profile success was a bid for RJR Nabisco. Management had made a bid to buy RJR for some $66 a share. A competitive bidding process ensued with KKR, eventually winning control of the company for $129 a share – a 95% premium on management’s claim of what was “fair value”.

The company was taken private and a total overhaul, including sale of the company’s management air travel fleet – known colloquially as the “RJR Airforce”. Once performing well – some three years later – RJR was floated again and that, at a significant premium to the $129 a share KKR paid. Consolidation of assets, management and a ruthless focus on customers had served to both add significant value to owners and for customers.

Much more recently another American icon, Gibson Guitars, whose products helped drive two generations of blues, rock, fusion and jazz and a bevy of household name guitar heroes (including, yes, purveyors of the unmentionable  “Stairway”) to fame lost touch with its customers. Quality control was poor and pricing strategies were so bad that Gibson’s became known as “guitars for doctors and lawyers”. A travesty to us musicians and cause of much hand wringing.

Not a recipe for success and bankruptcy followed.

Enter my favourites – KKR. The company was bought by KKR (now regarded as a seasoned and  respectable – or at least more respectable “Private Equity” firm) and a new CEO, formerly of Levi Strauss and a guitar enthusiast as well as turnaround manager was installed. A significant turnaround was implemented  – quality improved, costly but failing innovation attempts were abandoned and pricing was re-worked to realistic levels.

The resulting recovery and success was accelerated by lockdown driven demand from Covid responses (home grown guitarist numbers soared), and currently demand outstrips supply by a heathy margin.

Lessons aplenty. Focus on shareholders is critical and the primary means to add value for shareholders is through satisfying all elements of customer demand in a comprehensive fashion.

And of course….. don’t be sniffy.