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Representation Achieved by Force Fails
Law which purports to “require” representation fails two fundamentals of democracy:
- Laws which include or exclude, are instruments of force not voluntary commitment
- Democracy, rightly or wrongly, requires voluntary action
While attempts to camouflage this bare bones fact may sound elegant and seemly the law in this role is the ugly instrument of yesterday’s armies and operates by force and the threat of force. Representation which cannot be achieved without behaviour enforced by law is neither voluntary nor democratic.
Justified True Belief
It has long seemed to me that the oft cited definition of knowledge (and it harks back at least as far as Aristotle I think, and thus has pedigree) as “justified true belief” is a problem. The concepts of “truth” and “belief” do not sit happily in the same sentence. Even the most modest respect for logic would suggest that “belief” as an idea hinges crucially on the notion that in spite of a lack of evidence, “such and such” is nonetheless the case. Suggesting then that “truth” – a statement of what indeed is the case – can be justified on the basis of belief does involve some sort of mental flip which redefines belief itself. Surely it won’t do. Neither will provenance nor longevity make it so.
Thought starter
The famed biologist E.O. Wilson recently died aged 92. Amongst the Twitter posts noting this I read this quote of his: “The love of complexity without reductionism makes art; the love of complexity with reductionism makes science.”
A first reaction was mental rehearsal of all the arguments purporting to demonstrate that reductionism involves simplistic analysis of complexity such that essential elements of whatever is in question are either missed altogether, or understated, or distorted or become, at least, severely underrepresented. The opposite end of the argument typically sees art as involving romantic waffle bearing little resemblance to empirical observation, sloppy concepts, unmeasured dimensions, unworkable descriptions, and at least unacceptably loose thinking. The midpoint might be thought of as involving all the cowardice of no mans land with an accompanying lack of progress in any direction.
A bit of thought suggests that the statement is worth digging around in for a bit – not least because Wilson was one of the worlds serious thinkers and astute observers, his statement involves no judgment and is likely to have been made after some form of due consideration. Surely there are insights here?
List of Initial Planks
Here is the first list of planks or building blocks for the discussion of explanations and explanatory models. It is likely incomplete but that is not fatal:
- All explanations (and models – a term I subsume within “explanation”) are stories;
- Concepts such as “reality”, “actual”, “real”, “truth”, “true”, “fact” or “exists” are of no relevance as generic undefined concepts;
- All stories are provisional and are expected to change, be updated, altered and added to (or subtracted from);
- The measure of a “good story” versus a “bad story” is whether or not and to what extent it fulfils its purpose;
- The correspondence of a story to anything else – most noticeably to “objective reality” is irrelevant, likely unmeasurable and often unhelpful; and,
- A purpose is a specified intent of some kind and may have a short or long life, may be broad or narrow and may be familiar or unfamiliar and much else.
Given that some sort of beginning is required, this will start things moving.
Some other points will be set out to amplify the above. These will also be incomplete, but their purpose is to lend some flesh to the bare bones laid out above.
Experts Going Off-Piste May be Unhealthy
One of the more dangerous phenomena identified by those working in economics and the cognitive behavioural domain in recent years is the “Halo Effect”. This refers to situations in which expectations of the success and wisdom of those having expertise, experience, skill and success – perhaps even notoriety – in a given field such as sport, medicine, politics, art, mathematics, company management, politics or indeed any particular reasonably well defined arena is unjustifiably extended into other unrelated fields. This seems to be common.
Thus it is not uncommon to find All Blacks professing expertise in selecting the best garage door to buy, actresses promising longer, wrinkle free lives for all, and celebrities in almost any field lauding the benefits of goods, services and behaviours unrelated to their core knowledge and expertise.
There may be some underlying generic attributes which justify an element of this. Characteristics such as determination, energy, passion, dedication to an objective might be examples. However in a number of cases the halo reaching well beyond its originating point seems far fetched and unlikely to emanate from any serious basis for favourable compariuson.
At present we appear to suffer this problem in the health area. Expertise in epidemiology for example would seem no basis for predicting likely human behaviour in the light of public policy initiatives, significant success in diagnosis and treatment of various health conditions is not necessarily a crucial component in understanding behaviour patterns of groups or crowds or even individuals.
Prediction of economic outcomes and behaviour patterns in particular off the back of medical or public health expertise is likely a doomed enterprise subject, at the very least, to risks of enhancing uncertainty, offering inappropriate levels of risk aversity, ignoring critical factors (such as the relevant opportunity costs) and failing to come to grips with risk management optimisation or the need to avoid absolutes as benchmarks when desirable outcomes are inextricably bound up with comparative assessment.
A more sound approach then is for experts to “stay within their circle of competence” to quote Warren Buffett, and in particular refrain from making attention earning or seeking, melodramatic assertions regarding “problems” and their “solution”.
Demography is Your Destiny
Satisfying Labels are Indeed Dangerous
Frequently it seems, we are inclined to rush for “satisfying” labels such as “racism”, “bigotry”, “chauvinism”, “foreigner”, or, even more dangerously “inequity”, when a little attention to demography offers a simple, understandable and surprisingly strong explanation for things we don’t understand at first glance.
Vaccination rates may well be a case in point. Noticing that vaccination rates amongst Maori and Pacific communities have been lower than amongst the wider population there has been no shortage of “influencers” and experts pointing to all sorts of labels which carry vast amounts of political and emotional freight to “explain” why this would be.
Yet these communities have different age structures to the wider population often with an over representation of the young in them. Vaccines were not even released for younger age groups until well after the older age groups (the 65+ sub groups) had had them available for a good while. The release for age groups was staggered (for various reasons having little or nothing to do with ethnicity) over a significant period.
Thus the arithmetic and the calendar tells us a good deal more about the difference in rates than melodramatic statements and labels.
The danger arises because once some phenomena is safely relegated to its satisfying “ism” then listening stops, exploration for better explanation stops, emotionally charged or ratings driven behaviour abounds and lessons are not learned.
That is no way to improve our welfare. It is also pointlessly wrong and unpleasant.
A Critical Distinction
But what does it mean to believe in science? The British science writer Matt Ridley draws a pointed distinction between “science as a philosophy” and “science as an institution.”
The former grows out of the Enlightenment, which Mr. Ridley defines as “the primacy of rational and objective reasoning.”
The latter, like all human institutions, is erratic, prone to falling well short of its stated principles. Mr. Ridley says the Covid pandemic has “thrown into sharp relief the disconnect between science as a philosophy and science as an institution.”
Wall St Journal 23 July (remainder pay walled)